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Introduction 
The provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA) is at a critical juncture for a 
number of reasons. First, the rise of right-wing populism in a number of donor 
countries has led to vociferous arguments for reductions in foreign aid. It has also 
precipitated calls for donor aid policies to be driven overtly by economic self-interest 
and a securitization agenda. Second, an anti-aid narrative is being driven by right-
wing sections of the media in donor countries, such as the UK. This focuses on the 
perceived prioritization of the welfare of foreigners above domestic citizens, ill-
conceived aid programs, corrupt practices and abusive behavior by staff involved in 
providing assistance. Third, there has been a shift in the overarching perspective of 
traditional aid providers.1 At the Busan High-Level Forum (HLF4) meeting of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) 2 donors in 2011, a focus on ‘development 
effectiveness’ emerged (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2014). This diverges from the 
paradigm outlined and developed at the previous three high level fora (HLF1-3), held 
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in Rome (2003), Paris (2005) and Accra (2008). The HLF1-3 paradigm is based on 
using aid primarily to directly target poverty reduction. The shift by DAC donors to a 
broader objective of providing aid for development effectiveness is influenced by two 
main factors. First, a desire to increase the involvement of a wider group of actors in 
aid provision, particularly the private sector. Second, a need to increase collaboration 
with non-traditional donors, in order to make achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) by 2030 a realistic proposition. However, an important new aim of US 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is to provide a counterweight to the 
influence of China in aid recipient countries. Many ‘U.S. foreign affairs officials have 
pointed to countering China’s influence as a key objective of their agency’s 
programs’ (Igoe, 2018a). There are, thus, contradictory directions developing, as the 
most powerful member of the DAC, the US, takes a more overtly oppositional stance 
to Chinese aid than other donors in the group. Irrespective of the position taken 
towards its aid provision by DAC members, China is of rising importance in shaping 
the ideology, policies and practices of aid. Ideologically, China is less influenced by a 
market-driven aid model than the Western multilateral and bilateral donors. Its aid 
policies and practices also diverge notably from those of traditional aid providers. 
While China is diversifying its aid provision, the development of infrastructure 
remains a key element of its assistance.  China’s Ambassador to Nigeria, Zhou 
Pingjian,  for example, stated in March 2018 that ‘China's financing support to Africa 
is mainly invested in infrastructure construction…We are committed to intensive 
development. The large infrastructure projects are planned and moved forward along 
with promoting Africa's industrial development’ (Pingjian, 2018). 
This chapter provides an overview of the interrelated issues affecting ODA and 
situates a discussion of future trajectories for aid relations between traditional donors 
and China within these complex strands. It argues that, while significant shifts in the 
form of aid are inevitable, the direction of these changes is far from clear. Aspects of 
the Chinese model, based on blending aid with different forms of commercial 
investment, are likely to become more widely adopted by traditional donors. However, 
whether they will use a blending model in collaboration with Chinese development 
assistance to pursue large infrastructure projects, as part of a development effectiveness 
agenda, is more contentious. It is unlikely that traditional donors will switch their aid 
modalities significantly to come more into line with the Chinese model. The thinking 
behind the provision of aid by China for infrastructure projects, such as roads and 
      
energy, draws on the structuralist model that was prevalent in the 1960s. This approach 
centers on providing support for state-led development. Such a perspective is 
problematic for traditional donors, given their recent shift to an overt emphasis on the 
primacy of the private sector in providing aid. Any attempt to move aid towards a model 
based on a leading role for the state at the recipient end in coordinating major 
infrastructure development is likely to be opposed by budget holders and policy makers 
at multilateral aid providers (notably the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund) and at bilateral organizations, such as USAID and the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID). 
Two main implications for future studies emerge from this overview. First, more 
research is required on how realistic synergies are between traditional donors and 
China, given their divergent ideological, economic and political perspectives. Second, 
more evidence-based studies on the outcomes of Chinese aid are needed. Much analysis 
of Chinese development assistance remains based on broad generalizations concerning 
its benefits and shortcomings. There is a need for detailed analyses of the concrete 
outcomes for the intended beneficiaries of Chinese aid programs and projects. 
The chapter is divided into six main sections. First, as ODA is under concerted 
attack, arguments in its favor are briefly revisited. Second, the major elements of the 
DAC’s HLF aid paradigm are outlined, as they provide the framework for traditional 
ODA, which is facing intense pressure to change. Then three major critiques of the 
DAC model are discussed: literature focusing on the gap between the rhetoric and 
reality of aid provision; analyses advocating politically rooted solutions to aid failure; 
and the neoliberal critique, arguing that ODA should be halted and replaced by a 
market-led development trajectory. The next section discusses the implications of 
current attacks on aid by right-wing populists and sections of the media, linked to a 
move towards a securitization aid agenda on the part of important DAC donors. The 
literature on the growing significance of China as an aid provider, and its relationship 
with traditional donors, are assessed. The empirical focus of the chapter is 
predominantly on Africa. Finally, the central lines of argument in the different sections 
are brought together in the conclusions section. 
 
The Case for Aid in the Face of the Current Critical Onslaught  
Traditional aid provision by Western donors has its defenders, despite its 
increasing censure by neoliberals, right-wing populist political parties in donor 
      
countries and sections of the media. Analysts make a case for the continuing 
provision of aid, based on two main grounds.3 These formative reasons for giving 
ODA are worth revisiting, given the intensity of the criticisms facing aid at present. 
First, giving aid has been justified on moral grounds. Following Singer’s (1972) 
influential outline of the moral case for providing foreign aid to those in need, given 
the extent of poverty and deprivation that exists globally, a number of analysts have 
taken a similar stance. Riddell (2008: 413, 2011), for example, argues that there is a 
‘compelling case for governments to provide aid’ on the grounds of moral duty, given 
the vast inequalities of wealth between rich and poor nations. Moreover, Hulme 
(2016) makes the point that aid is provided partly because some developed countries 
recognize their role in shaping the economic and political structures that have caused 
poverty in other nations (largely through colonialism and the slave trade).  
Second, a case has been made for aid on the basis of its effectiveness in 
improving the lives of intended beneficiaries in the social and economic spheres. 
Sachs (2014, 2015, 2017) points to a number of successful aid programs and projects 
over the years in the area of public health, including increased control of the incidence 
of malaria and tuberculosis in recipient countries.  Sachs reiterated in 2015, his ‘big 
push’ argument, first outlined ten years previously: if external donors increase aid in 
the form of finance, as well as skills and technology transfer, the ‘end of poverty’ can 
be achieved. The developed world has the financial, technical and institutional 
capacities to make transformative change possible through aid: commitment is the 
main issue. More cautious analyses argue that aid is effective in certain contexts, to 
the extent that in its absence growth would be lower (McGillivray et al, 2011).  The 
context in which aid works well, however, remains hard to determine (Edwards, 
2014). Nevertheless, Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2016: 446) make the important summary 
point that ‘the large majority of up-to-date empirical studies in the economics 
literature have found positive impacts’ of aid at a macroeconomic level. 
Thus, for a number of analysts, a moral imperative for the developed world to 
give aid remains and its provision has led to improvements in the social and economic 
welfare of recipients, which can be demonstrated empirically. These two factors 
combine uneasily and unevenly in influencing the policies and practices of traditional 
donors, which provide ODA under the auspices of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
      
(OECD). The following section traces the development of the DAC model and 
highlights significant problems which its members find difficult to resolve. 
 
The Development of the DAC Aid Model  
Influenced by criticisms of donor behavior in Tanzania during the 1990s (Adams, 
2005, Helleiner et al, 1995), DAC members have considerably revised their approach 
to ODA provision since 2000, at least rhetorically. Major policy documents, resulting 
from high-level DAC meetings, outline principles to frame the way aid should be 
given (OECD, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011).  DAC donors emphasize the need for aid to 
be provided within a wider context of policy coherence for development (PCD). This 
entails ensuring that ‘the interactions among various policies in the economic, social, 
environmental, legal and political domains support countries on their pathway 
towards inclusive sustainable growth’ (OECD, 2015: 2). PCD further necessitates 
putting in place institutional mechanisms, processes, and tools to produce effective, 
efficient, sustainable and coherent policies in all sectors (ibid). A major issue 
concerning the PCD approach is how to incentivize donors to turn their rhetoric into 
reality. Among EU donors, for example, there is scepticism about the plausibility of 
providing aid within a PCD context. In the sphere of trade, ‘PCD-related measures in 
favour of developing countries look marginal in an overall EU strategy prioritising its 
economic and security interests’ (Latek, 2015: 1). 
The codification of aid principles has been developed at four DAC High-Level 
Fora (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness.4  The overarching aims of the HLF fora have been 
to learn the lessons of failures during the 1990s, in order to deliver aid more 
effectively, reduce transaction costs and increase the capacity of institutions in 
recipient countries to absorb and spend ODA. HLF1 in 2003 produced the Rome 
Declaration, outlining the need for donors to simplify and harmonize ‘operational 
policies, procedures and practices’ in order to avoid duplication (OECD, 2003). Two 
years later, HLF2 led to the publication of the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005). As 
well as reemphasizing the importance of harmonization, the Paris Declaration 
outlined four other fundamental aid principles for donors: mutual accountability, the 
need for alignment with the wider development objectives of recipients, ownership of 
aid policies on the part of the intended beneficiaries and managing for achievable 
results. HLF3 in 2008 led to the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), which emphasized 
the need to ensure that aid outcomes have a ‘real and measurable impact on 
      
development’ (OECD, 2008). The AAA also recognized for the first time Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) as ‘development actors in their own right’ (Oxfam, 
2012: 3). At HLF4 in 2011 in Busan, two issues of importance to the analysis in this 
chapter were raised: it was stated that there was a need for the greater participation in 
aid provision of both non-traditional donors from the south and the private sector. It 
was acknowledged in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
(BPEDC) that the ‘Paris Declaration did not address the complexity of these new 
actors’ and that ‘South-South co-operation continues to evolve, providing additional 
diversity of resources for development’ (OECD, 2011: 4). Furthermore, there was a 
pledge to ‘enable the participation of the private sector in the design and 
implementation of development policies and strategies’ (OECD, 2011: 10). 
The BPEDC concludes by asserting that DAC donors will ‘hold each other 
accountable for making progress against the commitments and actions agreed in 
Busan, alongside those set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and 
Accra Agenda for Action’ (OECD, 2011: 12). To this end, a Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) has been created, which is responsible 
for implementing the commitments made at Busan. Finally, a Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness (WP-EFF) has been established - consisting of representatives of the 
DAC and other stakeholders - to work on reaching an agreement on how to put the 
GPEDC into practice. 
Overall, the DAC aid model has evolved since the Rome Declaration (2003) to 
take account of the increasingly complex architecture of ODA. The need to engage 
with a growing range of actors involved in the contemporary ‘many-to-many’ 
(Ramalingam, 2013: 5) world of aid provision is foregrounded in the Busan 
Principles. However, the core aid principles outlined in the HLF fora focus 
overwhelmingly on technical ways of providing aid effectively and lack nuanced 
engagement with complex socio-political structures and processes in both recipient 
and donor countries. Criticisms of the model have proliferated in the second decade of 
the twenty-first century. Only one year after the publication of the Accra Agenda for 
Action in 2008, for example, Whitfield (2009: 4) argued that ‘everyone knows that 
foreign aid is not working as intended, and that something must change’. While shifts 
in DAC aid provision have occurred since this statement, a growing range of literature 
has continued to highlight the inadequacies of the model. Two main lines of criticism 
are outlined in the following section. 
      
 
The DAC Aid Model under Increasing Pressure to Change 
Critics of the DAC aid model can be broadly divided into two camps. First, 
there are reformists who support the continued provision of aid but highlight the need 
to address problems with the model, which they identify as emanating from the 
political domain. In short, ‘the politics matter’ (Glennie, 2014: 553). Second, a 
number of neoliberals argue that the existing aid model is fundamentally flawed and 
should be radically altered or abandoned. The key arguments of these two lines of 
criticism are discussed in turn. 
 
The Rhetoric-Reality Gap in the Provision of Aid 
Donors have consistently failed to implement important principles outlined in 
DAC documents. The gap between the rhetoric contained in the DAC publications 
and the reality of aid provision on the ground remains significant. Problems in 
relation to, first, harmonization and second, ownership are used to illustrate this 
failing. These two concepts have been selected, as they have been emphasized as key 
to the success of aid since the 1980s by the World Bank, the largest and most 
influential Western donor (World Bank, 1988). 
The first HLF (OECD, 2003) in Rome focused on the need for donor 
harmonization, in order to lower transaction costs. The Rome Declaration (OECD, 
2003: 10) argues that it is beneficial to ‘simplify and harmonise [aid] requirements 
and reduce their associated costs, while improving fiduciary oversight and public 
accountability and enhancing the focus on concrete development results.’ However,  
studies since the publication of the Declaration highlight the continuing failure of 
donors to harmonize effectively.  For AFRODAD (2007) harmonization in Cameroon 
has been negatively affected by the reluctance of donors to stop interfering in aid 
processes, along with weak recipient strategies and institutions. Woods (2008: 1221) 
shows that traditional donors find ‘coordination among themselves very challenging’. 
Winters (2012: 36), using Indonesia as a case study, finds that harmonization is 
hampered because of ‘the strategic interests of the donors, the incentives faced by aid 
bureaucrats and the variation in interests within aid-recipient governments.’ Leiderer 
(2015: 1441) demonstrates that there remain ‘strong disincentives for effective 
coordination, even between like-minded aid providers’ and this is unlikely to change 
until there is a shift in incentive structures, so that donors’ rhetorical commitment to 
      
harmonization will be translated into behavioral change. Olivie (2016) points out that 
lack of donor harmonization is caused not just by political incentives but also by the 
weak institutional capacity of both donors and recipients. She highlights the 
disorganised nature of the institutional aid architecture in some EU states, which has 
hindered the provision of harmonised ODA to Morocco. This is exacerbated by the 
lack of readiness and will to coordinate aid effectively on the part of the 
administration in Rabat.  
These studies reveal that DAC aid provision continues to be based largely on 
individual donor self-interest, while recipients lack the institutional capacity and, in 
some cases, political will to engage effectively with harmonised ODA. Consequently, 
improved donor harmonization in providing aid has been fitful at best since its 
importance was highlighted in the Rome Declaration. The failure of traditional donors 
to harmonize their ODA effectively is exemplified by the point that ‘the aid system 
supports some 15,000 donor missions in 54 recipients countries per year – and in 
some countries this amounts to over 20 official visits per week’ (Ramalingam, 2013: 
3). Winters (2012), points out that the continued provision of ODA by donors based 
on their individual concerns, weakens not only harmonization but also their claims 
that ownership of aid policies by recipient governments is important.  
The significance accorded to ownership by DAC donors can be gauged from the 
fact that it is listed as the first of the key aid principles in the Paris Declaration, the 
Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation.  The focus of traditional donors on ownership precedes the Paris 
Declaration. In the early 1990s, Johnson and Wasty (1993) produced a piece of 
research for the World Bank, outlining detailed indicators of the concept and 
providing measurement criteria. This conceptualization of ownership influenced a 
later publication on the topic by the World Bank (2004). In addition, ownership 
became an important part of the practice of development in 1999 when it was made a 
defining concept of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). As Weeks et al. 
(2002: 72) point out, ‘no single policy was more associated with transferring 
ownership to aid recipients than the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.’ However, 
three years into the PRSP period, Cramer (2002) found that a theory of ownership was 
still lacking and Boughton and Mourmouras (2002) questioned whether it could be 
effectively operationalized. Despite the publication of these concerns, little detailed 
      
research by DAC donors ensued on how ownership should be theorised, 
operationalized and measured.  
Ownership was defined by the DAC donors in 2005 in the Paris Declaration as a 
situation where aid recipients ‘determine poverty reduction strategies autonomously, 
as well as focusing on institutional capacity building and addressing corruption’ 
(OECD, 2005). This broad and descriptive definition lacks analytical precision and 
makes accurate assessment of levels of ownership difficult. There is no detailed 
discussion in the Paris Declaration (or any of the other major DAC documents on aid 
provision) of the conceptualization of ownership and the measurement matrix 
provided by Johnson and Wasty (1993) and the World Bank (2004). Furthermore, the 
World Bank itself does not systematically use the measurement matrix. McQuinn 
(2012), examining the case of Tanzania, found that since the inception of PRSPs, the 
World Bank has not drawn on the classification scheme they published in 2004 to 
ascertain levels of ownership. The Bank, instead, measured the concept by employing 
broad rankings (from 1-5), assessing levels of participation as a proxy for ownership. 
Analyses of ownership have expanded since its significance was foregrounded in 
the Paris Declaration, both at the theoretical and empirical levels (see, for example, 
Dornan, 2017, Fisher and Marquette, 2016, Rose and Wiebe, 2015, Vogus and Graff, 
2015, Flint and Meyer zu Natrup, 2014, Buiter, 2010, Castel-Branco, 2008). Despite 
this body of work, an analytically rigorous and widely accepted characterization of 
the concept has remained elusive. In 2016, USAID still deemed it necessary to 
support research on defining ownership, resulting in the production of a working 
paper entitled Country Ownership In International Development: Towards a Working 
Definition (Watson-Grant et al, 2016).  
The examples of harmonization and ownership illustrate the significant size of 
the gap between the DAC principles at a rhetorical level and the reality of aid 
provision. In many cases, harmonization and ownership failures derive from both 
structural power imbalances between donors and recipients and the entrenched 
political interests of groups and individuals within aid institutions. Notable aspects of 
these issues are discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
Aid Failure in the Context of Complex Political Realities  
Several recent analyses of ODA provided by traditional donors highlight 
contradictions between the current dictates of the aid system and the complex 
      
actuality of political relationships involving donors and recipients, which makes 
successful provision difficult.  
First, aid failure has been linked to the over-concern of traditional donors with 
achieving value for money (VFM).  The concept of VFM has recently ‘become more 
prominent in the development agenda’ (Jackson, 2012: 1) and can be categorized as a 
‘re-emerging buzzword … [with]… a nice ring to it’ (Jayasuriya, 2013: 1).5 For 
Yanguas (2018: 203), the ‘VFM craze’ illustrates the general point that traditional 
donors have created a transactional model of aid.  Consequently, they are less 
concerned with transformational developmental outcomes than accounting for money 
expended on programs and projects. By concentrating on VFM, donors leave 
important and difficult political relationships and processes unaddressed, as they take 
time and are not easily amenable to quantitative measurement. The transactional 
nature of the system ensures that traditional aid providers concentrate on upward 
accountability to their funders, who prefer outcomes that can be enumerated and 
tabulated.  This focus means that downward accountability to intended beneficiaries 
on the part of important aid providers, such as international NGOs, tends to be 
neglected (Lawrence, 2018, Banks, Hulme and Edwards, 2015). 
Second, the preoccupation with VFM relates to the longer-standing concern of 
traditional donors with corruption. Anti-corruption programs have been a feature of 
traditional aid since the 1990s, as part of the wider donor-driven ‘good governance’ 
agenda (Dijkstra, 2017, Whaites et al, 2015, Sundaram and Chowdhury (eds), 2012, 
Grindle, 2007, Smith, 2007).  While corruption in aid provision is far from a recent 
issue of concern, it rose to the top of the aid agenda in the latter part of 2017, driven 
by the critiques of neoliberals, right-wing populist politicians in donor countries and 
sections of the press, emphasizing the unprincipled nature of many programs. 
Corruption is clearly a verifiable problem in relation to aid provision. Manning 
(2012), for example, highlights the way aid has been used to strengthen the executive 
branch of recipient governments at the expense of countervailing forces, with 
negative consequences for local accountability. In a number of cases, a clique of 
ministers and other officials at the recipient end control aid flows and are distanced 
from rigorous oversight by parliaments, the media or civil society. Danish (2016) 
illustrates how this has happened in Afghanistan, where ‘corruption consistently goes 
unpunished’. Kenny (2017), nevertheless, makes the point that the obsession of 
donors with reducing corruption, fueled by a defensive attitude to aid provision, has 
      
led to insufficient focus on the outcomes of programs and projects. Prevailing 
approaches to curbing corruption are costly and do not measure the phenomenon 
accurately. More attention should be paid to how the outcomes of aid programs and 
projects affect the intended beneficiaries. This is a significant point, which will be 
revisited in the section below on Chinese aid. 
Third, a number of analysts focus on how the power of traditional donors entails 
a loss of policy space for recipients, through the imposition of conditionalities and 
overbearing policy advice. This inculcates policy incoherence in recipient 
governments and leads to a lack of long-term strategic visions, culminating in the 
demise of national development planning (Oya and Pons-Vignon, 2010). A study by 
Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King (2016) illustrates the salience of this perspective. Their 
research revealed that the IMF loan agreements between 1985 and 2014 contained 
55,465 individual policy conditions across 131 countries. These statistics reveal the 
close control the IMF maintains over the policies of aid recipients and add weight to 
the argument of Winters (2012), outlined above, that ownership of aid policies by 
recipients remains more at the level of rhetoric than reality. 
Fourth, a line of argument has been advanced that aid failure is inescapable 
within the system created by traditional providers, since it is based on compromises 
between donors and recipients that are unworkable in the long term. For Swedlund 
(2017), fads in aid delivery are attempts to overcome commitment problems that 
undermine policy agreements reached by providers and receivers. Incentives are 
required that realistically allow donors and recipients to fulfil their aid commitments. 
At present this is not the case and aid policies are based on negotiated settlements 
between providers and recipients, which break down, after an initial period of 
enthusiasm, due to constraints at both ends. Paul (2015) provides an illustration of this 
point in an examination of Performance-based Aid (PBA).  She shows how donors 
have inadequately engaged with the fact that budgetary processes in recipient 
countries tend to be rigid. When donors release aid packages ex post, following what 
they have deemed to be an ‘acceptable performance’ by recipient governments in 
enacting ‘necessary’ policy reforms, a slow bureaucratic process towards final 
disbursement by various ministries occurs.   
These critiques provide insights into the multiform political relationships 
involving aid donors and recipients, which militate against the success of programs 
and projects, within the existing system. They stop short of calling for a halt to aid 
      
and argue that meaningful reform is possible. Further down the critical line is a 
resurgent neoliberal perspective, which not only highlights serious aid failings but 
calls for ODA to be ended or changed beyond all recognition. This approach has been 
the subject of considerable analysis. However, since it has gained traction in the light 
of the rise of the populist right in a number of traditional donor countries and aid 
corruption scandals, core elements of the perspective are examined in the following 
section. 
 
The Influence of the Neoliberal Critique of Aid 
Drawing on the work of Bauer (1976), the neoliberal approach centers on the 
argument that development can be achieved, not through the provision of aid, but by 
greater integration of countries into a global free market economy.  For Bauer (1981: 
55) ‘the concept of the Third World and the policy of official aid are inseparable. 
Without foreign aid there is no Third World.’  
The neoliberal critique of aid increased in influence from the 1980s with support 
from prominent analysts, such as Friedman (1995). Neoliberals argue that aid is 
inefficient, since it typically entails market distortions in the form of subsidies and 
price controls. Furthermore, the provision of ODA creates a mentality of dependence 
among recipients and fosters corruption. It also, through ill-informed donor influence, 
leads to the misallocation of scarce resources, stifles innovation, and redirects the 
energies of entrepreneurs away from business towards lobbying to obtain aid 
contracts or attempting to join aid bureaucracies. In addition, aid precludes recipient 
governments from having to show ‘good governance’ to citizens and in particular 
taxpayers (Easterly, 2016).  
Moyo (2010) contends that all aid should be halted within a five-year period, 
given its longstanding failure to stimulate development and reduce poverty. She 
argues that although Africans have received more than US$1 trillion in development 
assistance, ‘the recipients of this aid are worse off; much worse off. Aid has helped 
make the poor poorer, and growth slower. Yet aid remains a centrepiece of today’s 
development policy and one of the biggest ideas of our time’ (Moyo, 2010: xix). 
This neoliberal perspective has influenced the recent shift by donors to market-
driven forms of aid provision. There is, therefore, a trend among major donors to shift 
‘official development assistance to their private development arms’ (Anders, 2016). 
For example, in pursuing the SDGs, the World Bank (2015) states that ‘financing 
      
from private sources, including capital markets, institutional investors and businesses, 
will become particularly important.’ 6  At a bilateral level, the Department for 
International Development (DfID) has foregrounded the importance of the private 
sector in the provision of UK aid. Its 2017 Aid Strategy document states that the 
organization will increase its use of capital ‘to create jobs, catalyse private sector 
investment and build markets in challenging settings’ (DFID, 2017: 10). 
Overall, the neoliberal emphasis on the virtues of the free market, within which 
individual enterprise is key to economic success, resonates in the contemporary 
climate of fierce criticisms by right-wing populist politicians and media outlets of 
state-centered ODA provision.  The nature of these critiques is summarized in the 
following section. 
 
Media and Right-wing Populist Attacks on Aid 
The rise of right-wing populism in donor countries, such as the UK and the US, 
has fostered a climate where foreign aid is routinely criticized in political speeches 
and media articles as wasteful and corrupt. In the UK, a number of right-wing 
publications have mounted concerted anti-aid campaigns over the last few years. The 
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Such sustained censure influences the public’s perception of aid. Revelations 
concerning the behavior of staff at well-known aid agencies, such as Oxfam, have 
exacerbated the media criticisms (Hirsch, 2018, Moise, 2018, Foulkes, 2018).  Media 
coverage of misconduct by Oxfam staff has been cited as causing a fall in funds raised 
for UK Sport Relief 2018 by one third compared to the previous year (Siddique, 
2018). Moreover, hostile media campaigns can have negative implications for 
government funding of ODA. Heinrich, Kobayashi and Bryant (2016) show that aid 
cuts can occur because politicians are aware that voters place a lower priority on 
ODA during periods of economic disquiet. In the majority of DAC donor countries, 
there is considerable economic uncertainty, which has precipitated calls by right-wing 
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politicians for foreign aid to be reduced and reoriented towards securing national 
interests. The rising importance of such perspectives is discussed in the following 
section.  
 
Aid in support of Donors’ National Interests 
The argument that aid is provided primarily to promote the national (and 
international) interests of donors is not new (see, for example, Hayter, 1971). 
However, in 2017 and 2018, forceful and direct arguments that aid should be 
redirected to serve their national interests have been outlined by important political 
figures from a number of DAC donors (Trump, 2018, for example). This adds another 
layer of complexity to debates concerning the future relationship between traditional 
donors and China in providing aid. 
In 2018, senior politicians in the UK and the US have made strident calls for 
ODA to be aligned much more closely with their foreign policy and commercial 
interests. Boris Johnson, when British Foreign Secretary in 2017, stated in relation to 
aid that “the old jam jars are being smashed…  [and] the cash will be more sensibly 
distributed with a view to supporting British foreign policy” (Barnett, 2017). His 
perspective is echoed by Penny Mordaunt, who shortly after becoming the Secretary 
of State for International Development in November 2017, outlined a vision for UK 
aid prioritizing “projects which deliver a much more explicit win for the UK's 
interests as well, because without that we won't be doing aid well” (Anders and 
Edwards, 2018).  
These ‘interests’ center on security issues, as well as economic gain. For 
example, the UK National Security Council (NSC) now controls substantial funding 
streams for aid programs, such as the 2017 £1.7 billion Conflict, Stability and 
Security Fund (CSSF). This is a cross-governmental fund, which aims to spend 30% 
of ODA through departments other than DFID. Started in 2015, the CSSF is 
administered through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).  The UK 
government justifies this shift to a focus on aid for securitization by pointing to the 
vast amount human suffering globally caused by conflict and instability. This  
perspective is supported by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI). In a 
2018 review of the CSSF’s aid programming expenditure, the ICAI found conflict to 
be ‘both a major constraint on development and poverty reduction, and a source of 
      
threats to the UK and its interests.’ (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2018: 
1).  
The CSSF is composed of blended ODA and non-ODA funds, such as spending 
on security issues or the military. This makes oversight problematic, since the ICAI is 
only mandated to evaluate ODA.  Concern has been expressed by the then Chief 
Commissioner, who asks ‘how can we … say meaningful things about effectiveness 
of programing when actually there is quite a lot of blending going on?’ (Anders, 
2017).  Where ODA provided by the CSSF is clearly delineated, its quality has been 
criticised. The 2018 ICAI evaluation of the CSSF’s work led to the award of an 
amber-red assessment, signalling ‘unsatisfactory achievement in most areas, with 
some positive elements … improvements are required for UK aid to make a positive 
contribution (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2018).  The same evaluation 
highlights the importance attached to VFM, which was outlined in section 3 above. 
One of the core recommendations of the evaluation is, ‘where the CSSF projects are 
intended to support diplomatic access and influence, the influencing objectives should 
be explicit and progress reported so that the value for money of the investment can be 
confirmed’ (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2018: 1). 
As well as the UK, the securitization of aid has become a major plank of US policy. 
The Trump administration plans significant cuts to the  2020 aid budget, focusing on 
reductions in funds for humanitarian aid, refugee assistance and global health 
programs (Morello, 2019). Harris et al (2017) are among a number of analysts who 
argue that the ‘cuts are … indicative of the wider push to tie development aid with 
U.S. national security interests’ (Harris et al, 2017: 1). This orientation was illustrated 
in President Trump's first State of the Union speech, in which he stated that “I am 
asking Congress to pass legislation to help ensure American foreign assistance dollars 
always serve American interests and only go to friends of America, not enemies of 
America” (Trump, 2018).   
At the supranational level, the World Bank is increasing its aid markedly to 
countries affected by conflict, violence and fragility. In March 2018, the International 
Development Association (IDA) section of the World Bank committed to increasing 
financing to fragile and conflict affected countries from $7 billion to $14 billion over 
the next three years (Igoe, 2018b). It will also train 150 staff to become specialists in 
issues relating to fragility, violence and conflict. The Bank emphasizes that the 
expansion is necessary because its success in ending extreme poverty globally 
      
‘depends upon greater focus, stronger collaboration and deepening the effectiveness 
of our work in places where [fragility, violence and conflict] threatens so many lives 
(World Bank, 2018: i).  
In sum, an increasing amount of aid from the World Bank is being directed to 
countries affected by conflict and some influential DAC donors are adopting a 
securitization agenda. These shifts are not without controversy. Easterly (2010) 
argues that aid to conflict affected countries has a track record of appropriation by 
undemocratic leaders and donors often do not address this issue. Aid to conflict 
affected countries has also been taken by opposition groups using violence in their 
efforts to control resources and territory, as well as political power.  Furthermore, 
Moseley (2009) contends that increasing use of ODA for security purposes could lead 
to the ‘blanket militarization’ of aid.   
However, Brown and Gravingholt, (2016) make the salient point that only some 
donor countries are explicitly shifting aid into an instrument of pursue their national 
or international economic, political and security interests. Recognising the importance 
of context specificity is, thus, necessary when analysing this issue. Research is 
required on which DAC donors are shifting towards giving aid primarily for 
securitization purposes, which are providing assistance guided, at least in part, by the 
main precepts of the Paris Declaration, and which have still other agendas, such as 
economic self-interest.   
This section has shown that traditional aid has been subjected to increasing 
criticisms, and its bilateral providers driven in contradictory directions, despite their 
membership of a unitary body – the DAC. Contemporaneously, China has been 
growing in importance and influence as a supplier of foreign assistance, often blended 
with commercial investment in recipient countries. In the following section, notable 
elements of Chinese aid are outlined and the likelihood of cooperation or competition  
with DAC donors - in the light of their changing perspectives and modalities - is 
assessed.  
 
Chinese Foreign Assistance  
In 2018 the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) was 
opened. The aims of the agency are to formulate ‘strategic guidelines, plans and 
policies for foreign aid, coordinate and offer advice on major foreign aid 
issues, advance the country's reforms in matters involving foreign aid, and 
      
identify major programs and supervise and evaluate their implementation’ (CIDCA, 
2019). CIDCA’s broader task is to make coordination more transparent and effective 
between the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), which play key roles in directing the blending of Chinese ODA with 
commercial investments. A further noteworthy goal of CIDCA is to ‘allow aid to fully 
play its important role in great power diplomacy’ (Reuters, 2018).  
The creation of CIDCA is a considerable achievement for a country, which has 
raised 700 million people above the poverty line in the past thirty years (World Bank, 
2016), accounting for almost 75% of global poverty reduction (United Nations 
Development Program, 2015). Brautigam (2010) makes the point that, while there are 
vociferous critics of its foreign assistance, China’s commendable record in alleviating 
poverty in recent history puts the country in a position to provide viable aid ideas, 
strategies and models. 
Research on Chinese aid is increasing but significant gaps remain. A little more 
than a decade ago, China was labelled a ‘rogue’ donor and accused of ‘pricing 
responsible and well-meaning aid organizations out of the market in the very places 
where they are needed most’ (Naim, 2007).  Since then a number of detailed 
overviews have shown this to be a simplistic perspective. Brautigam (2010) argues 
that Western analysts need to avoid sensationalism and paranoia about Chinese aid to 
Africa and may be better served by addressing the shortcomings of the DAC model. 
She outlines innovative ways in which China is blending aid and business activities in 
recipient countries. Brautigam also shows that China is trying to learn from the 
methods used effectively by aid donors in the past, and is willing to adjust its own 
strategies and practices, according to outcomes.  
Recent research by Dreher et al (2017: 26) finds that Chinese aid ‘boosts 
economic growth in recipient countries’. Moreover, ‘Chinese, U.S. and OECD-DAC 
aid produce similar economic growth impacts. We also find no evidence to support 
the idea that Western aid is less effective at accelerating economic growth in countries 
that also have significant access to Chinese aid’ (Dreher et al, 2017: 26). These 
findings have positive implications for a deeper aid relationship between China and 
DAC donors. However, for synergies between China and DAC donors to work 
effectively, greater depth of understanding is needed of how the former blends aid 
with other forms of investment. Xu and Carey (2015) are among researchers who 
argue that greater transparency concerning the way China provides assistance to 
      
foreign countries is needed. In addition, more micro-level empirical studies focusing 
on outcomes for aid recipients are required. Such research would be particularly 
useful in the context of Africa, given China’s increasing levels of investment in, and 
assistance to, countries continent-wide. 
Detailed studies of China’s economic and political with Africa - both at a 
continent-wide and individual country-based level - are increasing. The China-Africa 
Research Initiative (CARI), based at Johns Hopkins University, has produced 
evidence-based analyses of various aspects of economic and political relationships 
since 2014.  Oqubay and Yinfu Lin (2019) have edited a wide ranging examination of 
Africa's economic development in the context of its relationship with China. The 
research highlights the need for context specific assessments, given the diverse nature 
of political economy regimes across Africa. Alden and Large (2019) have coordinated 
an overview of methodological and theoretical approaches to studies of China-Africa 
relations, outlining areas where repositioning would be beneficial. This is timely, 
given that a number of analyses (Ndzendze, 2019, for example) point to the lack of 
robust theoretical analysis, which characterizes a number of China-Africa studies. 
Yuan Sun (2017) has examined the role of China in the ongoing industrialization 
process in Africa, outlining the possible economic, political and social changes that 
may ensue from the growing number of Chinese-run factories on the continent.  
At a nation-state level, Oya (2018) has assessed labour regimes in Ethiopia and 
Angola, comparing conditions and relationships in Chinese-run workplaces with those 
financed by domestic and other foreign capitalists. Ching Kwan Lee (2018) has 
produced a detailed ethnographic assessment of varieties of Chinese capital 
investment in the copper mining and construction sectors in Zambia.  Sylvanus (2013) 
has researched Chinese textile traders in Togo. She shows that there are shifting and 
dynamic relationships between Chinese and Togolese actors and institutions, with 
agency significant on both sides. Mohan and Lampert (2012) also demonstrate, using 
Nigeria as a case study, that African actors beyond the state level are increasingly 
negotiating and shaping engagements with China.  
These studies provide nuanced analyses, highlighting the point that China is not 
simply dictating the pattern of its investment in Africa. In contrast, China’s strategies 
and policies are dynamic and increasingly influenced by the agency of a variety of 
African actors, not just a state-elite. 
      
However, similarly detailed studies of Chinese aid to Africa are less in evidence. 
Yuan Sun, Jayaram and Kassiri (2017) make the point that more research is necessary 
on the outcomes of Chinese aid in particular contexts in Africa, rather than a focus on 
inputs and methods. This is not a simple task, since ‘it is hard to identify data 
disaggregating China’s foreign aid’(Carter, 2017: 11). A few studies exist, focusing 
on particular sectors. King (2013), for example, has produced a study of Chinese aid 
to provide education and training in Africa. However, more micro-level research on 
Chinese aid programs and projects would act as a useful complement to the work of 
Dreher et al (2017) and Brautigam (2010), which takes a broader sweep in examining 
the effects of China’s ODA to Africa.  
Whether the increased production of evidence-based research showing the 
outcomes of Chinese aid would increase the possibilities of meaningful collaboration 
between China and traditional donors is debateable. A discussion between traditional 
DAC donors and China over aid provision is occurring.  However, Yifu Lin and 
Wang (2017) point out that this dialogue needs to be wider, deeper and more 
transparent in order to generate effective collaboration. Both parties have misgivings 
concerning aspects of the others aid provision, which are not easily overcome. Yifu  
Lin outlines a  New Structuralist Economy (NSE) model, which frames the way 
China provides assistance to other countries. This model is based on evidence that in 
the period following the end of the Second World War, developing economies which 
successfully achieved developed status, primarily used structuralist policies, based on 
state-led intervention (Yifu Lin and Wang, 2017). A prominent example is Japan, 
which provided aid to China based on this model of development. Influenced by these 
policies, and the form of ODA it received from Japan, China, therefore, situates its aid 
provision within an overarching vision of structural and state-centered change.  
Within this broad perspective, however, the Chinese aid model is practically 
oriented and not propelled by an extensively researched and detailed ‘conceptual 
model of development’ (Xue, 2014: 41). Given the ideological adherence of the 
traditional donors to market-led aid and the increasingly critical stance of US aid 
agency officials towards the Chinese model, much work needs to be done if 




      
Conclusions 
ODA provided by traditional donors is at an inflexion point. Important changes 
are being driven by a number of complex and, in certain respects, contradictory 
influences. First, more than ten years after the publication of the Paris Declaration, 
which framed the way ODA should be provided by OECD-DAC donors, a 
considerable gap remains between the rhetoric and the reality of disbursement.  The 
utility of the principles outlined in the Paris Declaration (and updated at Accra and 
Busan) is increasingly questioned. Second, a number of recent analyses of aid 
highlight ways in which traditional donors are failing to engage effectively with the 
deeply political nature of its provision. Third, traditional donors are increasingly 
giving primacy to private sector provision of ODA, influenced by neoliberal policy 
prescriptions for development. Fourth, ODA is facing concerted and trenchant 
criticism from a number of quarters, including neoliberal analysts, governments of 
major DAC providers, such as the US, and sections of the right-wing press in donor 
countries. These critiques emphasize the issues of poorly conceived programs, the 
venality and ingratitude of some recipients, as well as corruption and misbehavior on 
the part of officials at the aid agencies of donors. Fifth, largely due to the criticisms 
outlined above, there is a drift away from the two formative reasons for providing 
foreign assistance: the moral imperative and the belief that aid can improve the 
economic and social welfare of people in recipient countries. Instead, a number of 
traditional donors are overtly justifying the use of aid to pursue national interests, 
focusing on security concerns and their own economic gain. 
Within this complex scenario, China’s importance and influence as an aid 
provider continues to increase. Research shows that aid provided by China is having a 
beneficial impact on economic growth in recipient countries. Studies demonstrating 
positive economic outcomes from aid provided by DAC donors have also been 
produced. Thus, as Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2016: 472) argue, ‘calls for the extinction 
of aid and its associated institutions on the basis of poor or negative returns are 
unjustified’.  
These findings raise the question of how effective complementarity between 
aid provided by China and traditional donors can be increased. For this to happen 
more research is needed on the outcomes of particular Chinese aid programs and 
projects. This would add weight to the evidence showing a correlation in some 
countries between receiving Chinese aid and subsequent economic growth. More 
      
empirical research on how exactly China uses blending of foreign assistance with 
other types of investment would also be useful. The publication of detailed overviews 
of how blending works at program and project levels would help to dissipate the 
unease some DAC donors continue to exhibit about the nature of Chinese assistance. 
Such overviews could provide useful lessons for DAC donors, given their own shift 
towards blended aid provision. However, even with the publication of such research, 
the present ideologically-driven predilection of traditional donors for assistance led by 
the private sector, as well as moves on the part of some countries towards the 
provision of aid based on a securitization agenda, are factors complicating the 
possibilities of cooperation with China. Furthermore, research summarized in this 
chapter shows that traditional donors continue to provide much aid through misguided 
attempts to inculcate political reform in recipient countries. The research demonstrates 
that such efforts have little chance of success when they are set within the structural 
and financial constraints of the established aid system and the prioritization of a value 
for money (VFM) agenda on the part of donors. These restrictions render the policy 
coherence for development (PCD) agenda on the part of DAC donors largely 
meaningless. They also reduce the possibilities of effective complementarity between 
traditional and Chinese aid providers.  
Nevertheless, the importance attached by the IFIs and DAC donors to 
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 is an incentive for them to 
adjust their ideologies, strategies and practices. The SDGs are unlikely to be attained 
without considerable aid from China, as well as other non-traditional donors. This 
factor could incentivize the traditional aid donors to work more closely with China in 
providing aid. Given that this is an instrumental motivation, rather than one stemming 
from a wholehearted desire for cooperation and compromise, Chinese aid providers 
are likely to be cautious in the way they reciprocate.  
Empirically, this chapter has focused mainly on Africa, where the proportion 
of people living in poverty has decreased in the last twenty years. However, the 
absolute number of poor people living on the continent increased in the same period 
due to rapid population growth in the poorest segments of society. Furthermore, 
quality jobs are scarce and young people, in particular, suffer from underemployment 
and a scarcity of secure wage-paying jobs (AU/OECD, 2018). Beyond the SDGs, 
therefore, an increase in the effectiveness of aid cooperation between China and the 
traditional Western donors in Africa would be useful in addressing these issues. 
      
1 Major traditional multilateral aid donors, in the context of this chapter, are the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and United Nations organisations. 
Traditional bilateral donors refer to the 29 OECD-DAC aid providers, as well as the 
European Union. 
2 Hereafter referred to as DAC donors. 
3 Arguments in favour of ODA are covered at a broad level only to frame the debates, 
as it is difficult to cover the ‘vast array of different sub-literatures’ (Riddell, 2008: 
xviii) on aid in detail in a single book chapter. 
4 A significant precursor to the four HLF was the International Conference on 
Financing for Development, held in 2002 in Monterrey. This produced the ‘Monterrey 
Consensus’ which outlines the need for aid to directly target poverty alleviation, 
based on developing effective partnerships between different agents of development. 
This was built on by the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development (2008) and 
the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (UNDESA, 2015), which align global ‘financing 
flows and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities.’ A progress 
report in 2017 found ‘a difficult global environment has impeded individual and 
collective efforts, and many implementation gaps remain’ (UNDESA, 2017). 
5 See, for example, DFID (2011) DFID’s Approach to Value for Money  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67479/
DFID-approach-value-money.pdf 
6 Statement by the Heads of the African Development Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European 
Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank Group and 
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